The accepted theory of Threat and Error Management 1,2 indicates that there is tremendous benefit to safe teamwork by attempting to avoid all possible problems in advance. From this has come the practice of team briefings before surgical procedures. However not everything can be foreseen and our memories of what has been discussed may be erroneous due to such as the passage of time, fatigue, hunger, personal stresses or just ineffective communication. For this reason the WHO Safer Surgical Checklist has been mandated and its use is accepted across healthcare surgery. However it seems from our experience that compliance is less than 100%. One of our Atrainability team has just had an operation where the WHO paperwork does not appear to have been completed and performance of the checks themselves somewhat suspect. Fortunately no harm has apparently occurred.
However the greatest opportunity for improving safety is a simple debrief. The front-line team are the most under-utilised source of learning from success as well as failure.
A recent investigation of a particularly tragic case highlights the resistance to learning from everyday events. Our team was taking part in a research project in a major hospital in 20083. A scrub nurse taking part in a neurosurgical procedure was asked to hand the surgeon a syringe of saline to wash out the operating site in the cranium of a child. The surgeon did not remove his eyes from the microscope and did not check the syringe. It so happened that the nurse was under training in this specialty and had mistakenly handed a local anaesthetic. Fortunately the error was trapped by the supervising scrub nurse who handed her the correct saline. Both syringes were externally identical – no colour-coding. The Consultant surgeon was completely unaware, but the Anaesthetist was fully aware.
Within 2 years of this a tragic but similar incident occurred in the same hospital. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-25916336
At the time of our observation the Consultant Anaesthetist declined to debrief with the team because "nothing happened".
No direct conclusion can of course be drawn but overcoming resistance to learning from near misses (near-hits?) should be a professional response.
Encouraging debriefing and responding appropriately to warnings of unsafe situations, avoiding unnecessary blame, must be the way forward for management and multi-disciplinary teams.
1) On error management: lessons from aviation - Department of Psychology, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712, USA Robert L Helmreich professor of psychology helmreich@psy. utexas.edu BMJ 2000;320:781–5
2) Culture, Error, and Crew Resource Management Robert L. Helmreich, John A. Wilhelm, James R. Klinect, & Ashleigh C. Merritt, Department of Psychology The University of Texas at Austin
3) Catchpole, K, Dale, T, Hirst, G, Smith, P, Giddings, A.(2010). A multi-centre trial of aviation-style training for surgical teams. Journal of Patient Safety 6(3), pp. 180-186.